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There is an increasing demand for Internet of Things (IoT) systems
comprised of resource-constrained sensor and actuator nodes exe-
cuting increasingly complex applications, possibly simultaneously.
IoT devices will not be able to execute computationally expensive
tasks and will require more powerful computing nodes, called edge
nodes, for such execution, in a process called computation offloading.
When multiple powerful nodes are available, a selection problem
arises: which edge node should a task be submitted to? This prob-
lem is even more acute when the system is subjected to attacks,
such as DoS, or network perturbations such as system overload.
In this paper, we present a trust model-based system architecture
for computation offloading, based on behavioural evidence. The
system architecture provides confidentiality, authentication and
non-repudiation of messages in required scenarios and will operate
within the resource constraints of embedded IoT nodes. We demon-
strate the viability of the architecture with an example deployment
of Beta Reputation System trust model on real hardware.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) devices are being deployed in a variety of
contexts including smart farming [16], healthcare [15] and smart
cities [22]. IoT devices have typically been deployed as a distributed
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system to perform sensing of their environment. Recently, there
has been interest in these devices to perform more complex tasks
(including actuation). An issue is that many of these devices are
resource-constrained, with limited processing power, data storage,
energy storage and other constraints.
Due to these resource constraints, it will be infeasible for IoT
devices
1
to perform computationally expensive tasks, e.g., machine
learning. Therefore, these tasks will need to be sent to resource-
rich (powerful) devices (or nodes) to execute, in a process called
computational offloading. These nodes may be accessible via the
internet (e.g., a Cloud service) or via edge nodes
2
that exist within
the same local network as the resource-constrained devices. For
a large class of applications, offloading to edge nodes is preferred,
e.g., when latency is important.
To meet demand, multiple edge nodes should be provisioned in
the network. However, a selection problem then arises: which edge
node should an IoT node choose to submit a task to? This is typically
addressed in the literature by evidence-based behavioural trust [32,
38], where the incidence of how well an edge node has correctly
executed tasks in the past is recorded and used as a predictor of
how likely that edge node is to correctly execute future tasks. Trust
is typically evaluated at the application level and sufficient storage
is needed to record information about each edge node of interest.
In vehicular and cellular networks, the task offloading problem is
referred to as Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC) [25]. However,
trust models that require a large amount of memory or processing
power to compute are not viable for resource-constrained (IoT) de-
vices. Hence, simpler models, e.g., the Beta Reputation System [21]
or hidden Markov models (HMM) [14], can be used instead.
While a suitable trust model is vital, its correct deployment is
equally important. Common internet infrastructure is typically
unsuitable due to the same resource constraints that necessitate
task offloading. Therefore, in this paper, we propose and describe
a system architecture for trust-based task offloading. The archi-
tecture is designed to support arbitrary trust models and multiple
applications running on both edge nodes and IoT devices.
We make the following contributions:
(1) We propose a system architecture for performing trust-based
task offloading for IoT devices.
(2) We profile cryptographic operations on Zolertia RE-Motes
and use this to inform the message protection strategy.
(3) We conduct a small deployment of the Beta Reputation Sys-
tem using Zolertia RE-Motes to demonstrate the efficacy of
the system.
1
By IoT devices, we mean devices that are resource-constrained.
2
By edge nodes, we mean resource-rich nodes at the edge of the network.
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The rest of this paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we
presented related work. Section 3 describes the system model and
Section 4 specifies the problem statement. In Section 5 the individ-
ual components of the system architecture are described. Section 6
describes the experimental setup used to obtain the results pre-
sented in Section 7. A discussion of the system is presented in
Section 8 before concluding in Section 9.
2 RELATEDWORK
There has been much work on standardising the fundamentals of
IoT device infrastructure. Typically many protocols designed for
general internet use-cases are too resource intensive and are de-
signed for high performance and not minimising costs in terms of
RAM, flash, computation, and energy. So, alternative protocols for
these resource-constrained systems have been developed, such as:
uIPv6 [11] for addressing, TSCH [36] for energy-efficient wireless
medium access and RPL [1] for packet routing. Higher level pro-
tocols have been implemented on top of these, such as CoAP [31]
which provides similar functionality to HTTP.
While security protocols such as DTLS can be used to protect
UDP traffic, there has been recent effort to standardise security
protocols specific to CoAP. OSCORE [28] provides encryption and
authentication of messages. Only a subset of headers are protected
to facilitate proxying which changes some CoAP fields. A benefit to
OSCORE is that it has low overhead compared to DTLS [18, 19] and
there remain unaddressed issues with multiple DTLS implemen-
tations [17], however, OSCORE does not provide forward secrecy.
Other approaches can involve trusted execution environments such
as ARM TrustZone [27].
Trust has also been used to solve a variety of problems in IoT
applications. Primarily, the security protocols deployed typically
need to provide identity trust, where one node can verify the au-
thenticity of a message sent from another node. Trust has been
used in a variety of areas, such as routing of messages in wireless
sensor networks [9], attack detection (such as intrusion into the
network) [6] and localisation [2]. In these areas, trust is evaluated
based on observations made about the device’s behaviours.
Trust models are important for systems where nodes do not
always behave correctly. Nodes may exhibit selective behaviour,
where services are correctly performed only some of the time [34].
For example, to save energy a node may choose not to forward all
messages that are routed through it. In networks where trust is
derived from reputation information, the impact of manipulations
of this information needs to be mitigated. An example is when
nodes bad-mouth other nodes by lying and indicating they have a
low trust value for another node [34].
There has been much work on developing trust models to solve
these problems beyond resource-constrained systems [32, 38]. In
vehicle and cellular networks the task offloading problem (which
we focus on in this paper) is referred to as Multi-access Edge Com-
puting (MEC) (previously Mobile Edge Computing) [25]. A variety
of solutions have been proposed for trust-based offloading in MEC
systems, typically involving machine learning approaches [26, 37],
linear programming (LP) [10], or game theoretic approaches [30].
However, these solutions are typically unsuitable for use in resource-
constrained systems. Many machine learning models, though not
all, require a large amount of memory or are expensive to compute,
and techniques such as LP or game theoretic approaches would
require large amounts of data to be sent to a central location to be
processed into a schedule which is costly in terms of energy. This
typically means that lightweight approaches are needed that are
evaluated on resource-constrained IoT devices.
The seminal example of a lightweight trust model is the Beta
Reputation System (BRS) [21]. The BRS maintains two counters
which are parameters to the Beta distribution, the number of good
events observed (𝛼) and the number of bad events observed (𝛽). A
trustor can calculate a trust value about a trustee via the expected
value of this distribution (the ratio of good events to the total num-
ber of events). These values can be updated with more observations,
allowing the belief in the trustee to be refined.
The BRS and other models such as those that use HMMs [14]
can allow the representation of trust in a small amount of space.
However, for these trust models to be effective in selecting a target
for task offloading, they need a suitable system to feed them with
observations and then deliver tasks to the chosen node.
3 SYSTEM MODEL
The system is modelled as a graph 𝐺 = (𝑉 , 𝐸), where:
• 𝑉 = 𝑉𝑅 ∪𝑉𝐶 ∪ {𝜌} is the set of nodes in the network, made
up of edge nodes (𝑉𝑅 ), IoT nodes (𝑉𝐶 ), and a root node 𝜌 ,
• 𝐸 ⊆ 𝑉 ×𝑉 is the set of communication links between nodes
in the network.
IoT devices exist within the network to perform sensing and
actuation. They are battery-powered with limited CPU power, RAM,
energy storage, and potentially no stable storage. For example, the
Zolertia RE-Mote [39] has a 32MHzCPU, 32 KiB of RAM, 512 KiB of
programmable flash, a 800mAh battery, and support for an optional
SD card. Communication in these devices is typically performed
using IEEE 802.15.4, Bluetooth Low Energy, or LoRaWAN. Edge
nodes support the IoT nodes by executing tasks that are either too
expensive or require access to data unavailable to IoT devices. The
special root node is equipped with similar resources to edge nodes
and performs dedicated tasks for the system.
4 PROBLEM STATEMENT
There is a set of applicationsA deployed in the network, for each of
which there is a variant deployed on an IoT devicesA𝐶 and a variant
deployed on edge nodesA𝑅 . There is a bijection 𝑓𝑎𝑝𝑝 : A𝑅 → A𝐶
from the edge node applications to IoT device applications. We
assume two functions (i) 𝐴𝐶 : 𝑉𝐶 → 2A𝐶 that returns the set of
applications on an IoT device and (ii) 𝐴𝑅 : 𝑉𝑅 → 2A𝑅 that returns
the set of applications on an edge node.
Tasks generated on IoT device 𝑐 for application 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝐶 (𝑐) will
need to be delivered to an edge node that hosts the corresponding
application. The edge nodes that can process these tasks are:
𝑉𝑎𝑅 = { 𝑟 | 𝑟 ∈ 𝑉𝑅 ∧
(
∃𝑎′ ∈ 𝐴𝑅 (𝑟 ) , 𝑓𝑎𝑝𝑝 (𝑎′) = 𝑎
)
} (1)
Definition 4.1 (Task Offloading). Given a IoT device 𝑐 ∈ 𝑉𝐶
and the task for application 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝐶 (𝑐) that 𝑐 needs to offload, which
edge node 𝑟 ∈ 𝑉𝑎
𝑅
should the job be offloaded to such that: (i) the task
will be accepted, (ii) 𝑟 returns a result within some deadline 𝑑 , and
(iii) the result is correct.



















































Figure 1: System functionality across the three device classes with example addresses
We assume that application tasks may not always be performed
correctly by edge nodes and that there may be failures in any of
the three conditions in Definition 4.1 due to edge nodes choosing
to intentionally behave badly (e.g., wanting to prefer some capabil-
ities over others) or due to other failures (e.g., transient network
failures) that may cause packets to be lost. The deadline of a task
is application-specific, some applications may be critical and have
an early deadline, whereas non-critical applications will have later
(possibly flexible) deadlines.
We propose to use a measure of trust as one approach to solve
the Task Offloading problem. The metric captures the likelihood
of a node to correctly execute an offloaded task. However, in order
to capture this behavioural trust, a system must first provide: (i)
identity trust and confidentiality, where messages between nodes
can be authenticated and protected, (ii) mechanisms to facilitate the
discovery of edge nodes and their capabilities, and (iii) mechanisms
to submit tasks, receive responses and make observations about
these actions. Depending on the trust model in use, it may also be
necessary to (iv) provide stereotype information about nodes to
bootstrap trust, and (v) facilitate the dissemination of reputation
information. This paper does not provide a solution to the Task
Offloading problem, but instead presents a system architecture
which facilitates the deployment of trust models that do.
5 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section we present a high-level description of our architec-
ture to perform trust-based task offloading, before describing in
detail the individual components. The system relies upon uIPv6 [11]
and RPL [1] for message routing, and CoAP [31] for reliable mes-
saging. As CoAP uses UDP this avoids the RAM cost of including
the TCP stack. CBOR [7] is used to encode the contents of CoAP
messages. For the security layer, OSCORE [28] provides encryp-
tion and authentication of CoAP messages. We plan to use Group
OSCORE [33] for messages that require no encryption but require
being digitally signed, as no implementation is available yet for the
draft standard.
We have performed an implementation
3
using Contiki-NG [12].
The Contiki-NG operating system uses a coroutine-based coopera-
tive scheduling model [13] instead of a multi-threaded model. The
impact of this design is that the multiple applications running need
3
Implementation source code: https://github.com/MBradbury/iot-trust-task-alloc.
to ensure that they behave well to avoid impacting other applica-
tions and tasks. For example, they will need to yield often enough
to allow other coroutines to execute.
This feature set is not limited to Contiki-NG, and other operating





have a similar set of features. While our implementation is specific
to Contiki-NG, the system architecture can be implemented on
alternate IoT OSes that support the required features.
A single root node is required as part of Contiki-NG’s implemen-
tation of RPL. On this single root node, a CoAP server (implemented
using aiocoap [3]) will be used to provide services to the network.
An overview of the system is shown in Figure 1.
We make the following assumptions as part of the development
of this system architecture:
(1) As IoT devices have finite lifetimes, they may be retrieved
and have batteries swapped at which point firmware updates
may be performed.
(2) The multiple applications running on a single device are
assumed to be mutually trusted [35], where one application
does not intentionally aim to negatively impact another.
(3) A measure of trust in an edge node is evaluated on the IoT
devices. While trust could be evaluated elsewhere in the
network, there are costs involved with the transmission of
observations and the device evaluating trust would need to
be assumed to behave well.
5.1 Public Key Infrastructure
This system is primarily focused on evaluating behavioural trust,
where the edge node is selected via an evidence-based evaluation of
their past behaviour. However, in order to provide a foundation for
behavioural-based trust, it is necessary that nodes in the network
have trust in the identities of other network nodes.
Each IoT device is pre-deployed with a root certificate, their own
certificate, and their secret key. This implementation uses the NIST
P-256 elliptic curve (EC) (also know as sepc256r1) for ECC keys
because the keys and signatures both take up a small amount of
space (64 B) compared to keys required for RSA at comparable bits
of security [23]. ECDSA signatures also provide non-repudiation
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Certificate = [
tbscertificate : TBSCertificate,




issuer : bytes .size 8,
validity : [notBefore: uint, notAfter: uint],
subject : bytes .size 8,
stereotype_tags : StereotypeTags,

















Request Public Key (Invalid Signature)
msc PKI
Figure 3: PKI Protocol
ECC operations are time consuming to compute, therefore we aim
to minimise the use of ECC operations where appropriate.
Due to the large size of X.509 certificates we use a CBOR-encoded
certificate similar to [20], whose contents is shown in Figure 2.
While the certificates support including the time at which they are
valid, not all systems may be capable of checking the validity. This
is because there may be no time-synchronisation protocol in use
that allows IoT devices to align their local clock with a global clock.
So in this system, certificates can be purged from the root node
once IoT devices are expected to have run out of battery.
To minimise the number of ECC operations that IoT devices
perform, a shared secret is provided to an OSCORE context so for
the majority of operations AES-CCM is used to encrypt and provide
authentication of messages. In order for a node 𝑛1 to create an OS-
CORE context with another node 𝑛2, elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman
(ECDH) is first used to generated a shared secret using 𝑛2’s public
key and𝑛1’s secret key. Therefore, ECC operations are only required
when deriving the OSCORE context, digitally signing/verifying spe-
cific messages, and verifying certificates.
At network deployment not all edge nodes may be known, this
means there is a need for IoT devices to be able to request keys for
unknown nodes from a key server on the trusted root node. The






Table 1: MQTT Topics
5.2 Resource-rich Capability Discovery
IoT devices need to discover edge nodes and their capabilities (i.e.,
what applications they are running). Discovery of these capabili-
ties aligns with a publish-subscribe model where IoT devices sub-
scribe to announcements of edge nodes publishing their capabilities.
MQTT [5] is a pub-sub protocol designed for IoT devices, however,
it has a number of downsides when integrating with this system.
Primarily, MQTT uses TCP to provide reliability, which means that
there would be an additional RAM cost by including the TCP library.
The use of MQTT would also mean that the security mechanisms
protecting CoAP messages could not be applied to MQTT messages.
To mitigate this overhead on the IoT devices, we instead imple-
ment MQTT-over-CoAP, where an application on the root node
translates CoAP messages into MQTT messages and vice versa.
The MQTT-over-CoAP translator application communicates with a
Mosquitto [24] server that provides the MQTT functionality.
There are four phases to resource-rich capability discoverywhich
are shown in Figure 4. The first requires IoT devices to subscribe
to the four topics in Table 1. The first wildcard entry (represented
by +) is the edge node’s EUI-64 in hexadecimal and the second
wildcard entry is the name of the capability.
The announce topic is used for edge nodes to announce them-
selves to others in the network. Their lightweight certificate is in-
cluded in the message so receivers do not need to request it. The re-
ceivers will validate the certificate upon reception. The capability
add topic is used for edge nodes to inform subscribers that a specific
capability is being provided by that node.
The unannounce and capability remove topics are used by
well-behaved edge nodes to inform subscribers that the node or
a capability is unavailable respectively. Malicious nodes may not
publish these messages, so IoT devices will need to be able to handle
this scenario when encountered.
5.3 Resource-rich Stereotype Request
An issue in trust-based selection is that when the system is starting
or a new entrant joins, there is little opportunity for historical data
to have been gathered and used to build a trust model. Therefore,
in order for facilitate better initial decisions, stereotypes can be
provided as a starting point to bootstrap trust models [32].
When an edge node announces itself, the certificate it sends
contains a set of tags which provide an abstract description of the
node. Once these tags are received, the stereotype for this set of
tags is requested from the root node as shown in Figure 5. When
choosing which IoT device to submit a task to, the stereotype with
the closest set of matching tags may be used in the process of
calculating the trust value for that edge node.



































publish add / publish remove resource-rich r capability c
msc Edge Capability Dissemination
Figure 4: Resource-rich Capability Discovery Protocol
5.4 Reputation Dissemination
Trust models may incorporate a measure of reputation into their
evaluation of the trustworthiness of an edge node. The reputation of
a trustee is the beliefs held by other trustors in the system and it is
stored in the same format as the trust model held by other trustors.
When a trust model incorporates reputation, each of the IoT devices
need a mechanism to disseminate their beliefs. It is important to
provide non-repudiation for messages containing reputation of
trustees so nodes cannot claim they had a different trust value in
the past. There is also no need for confidentiality, meaning the
messages can be signed and sent unencrypted.
There are multiple options for implementing dissemination of
reputation information, such as: (i) performing a network-wide
multicast, (ii) targeting specific nodes, (iii) performing a 1-hop
broadcast, or (iv) allowing nodes to request reputation information.
In this implementation we focus on (iii) and (iv) where IoT devices
perform a periodic dissemination of trust values and also allow
other nodes to request reputation information from arbitrary nodes.





































msc Trust and Reputation Dissemination
Figure 6: Trust Dissemination Protocol
5.5 Application
The messages that applications on IoT devices send to edge nodes
(the task-request and vice versa the task-response), will be pro-
tected by the OSCORE layer via encryption and authentication of
the message. While, some applications may not require confiden-
tiality, a generic layer will need to encrypt the messages in order
to facilitate applications that do require it. An example of the appli-
cation protocol is shown in Figure 7 for an application that sends
a periodic task every 𝑇 seconds. When a capability add for this
application is received, the application is started if it is not running.
For the first periodic action, an edge node may be selected which
lacks the IoT device’s certificate. The edge node will not acknowl-
edge the message and instead request the certificate. Either, when
the IoT device retries the certificate will have been retrieved, or
the IoT device will eventually timeout. Subsequent actions will not
need to repeat this as the edge nodes will cache the certificate.
In the case of failure, applications may choose to resubmit a task
to an alternate edge node. This is left up to the application as it will
require buffering the task to facilitate retrying it.






















Notified of removal of resource-rich r’s capability c
msc Application




using a deployment of six Zolertia RE-
Motes which have hardware acceleration for SHA2, AES-CCM-16-
64-128 (used by OSCORE), and 256 bit ECC operations. The key
benefit is hardware support for ECC operations which take a long
time to compute. Contiki-NG’s implementation allows the CPU to
execute other (potentially time sensitive) tasks while a message is
being signed or verified. Each RE-Mote was attached to a Raspberry
Pi which logged output. Two of the Raspberry Pis acted as Edge
nodes, performing expensive computation for applications.
The system frequently publishes capabilities (every 2min), dis-
seminates trust (every 2min), generates a monitoring task (every
1min) and generates a routing task (every 2 to 3min). These rates
are higher than typical in order to obtain results in a reasonable time
and would need to be adjusted based on the deployment performed.
To avoid memory fragmentation, fixed-sized pools are allocated
at compile time. Table 2 shows the default maximum number of
different types of objects that can be allocated and their RAM cost.
These values would need to be adjusted for different network sizes.
6.1 Example Trust Model
To illustrate the operation of this system we implement an example
trust model using the BRS. The trust value for each metric𝑚, edge
node 𝑟 and application 𝑎 is beta-distributed T𝑚 (𝑟, 𝑎) ∼ Beta(𝛼, 𝛽)
(application-specific) or T𝑚 (𝑟 ) ∼ Beta(𝛼, 𝛽) (application-agnostic)
where𝛼 is the number of successful interactions and 𝛽 is the number
of unsuccessful interactions. The expected value of the distribution
summarises the number of successful events that have occurred.
𝐸 [X] = 𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽 where X ∼ Beta(𝛼, 𝛽) (2)
6
Raw results for these experiments can be found at [8]
Name Count Entry (B) Total Size (B)
Certificates 12 288 3 456
Stereotypes 5 24 120
Edges 4 52 208
Edge Capabilities 12 28 336
Peers 8 32 256
Peer Edges 32 32 1 024
Peer Edge Capabilities 96 16 1 536
Table 2: Configuration constants and RAM cost
For any application-agnostic metric𝑚: T𝑚 (𝑟, 𝑎) = T𝑚 (𝑟 ).
Each IoT device 𝑐 maintains three sets of Beta distributions that
summarise interactions with edge node 𝑟 and application 𝑎:
• T
sub
(𝑟 ) — Did 𝑟 inform 𝑐 that a task was received and will
be executed?
• Tres (𝑟 ) — Did 𝑟 provide a result for a task?
• Tcorr (𝑟, 𝑎) —Was the result that 𝑟 provided for application 𝑎
correct?
Correctness is an application-specific and best-effort attempt to
validate if a result for a task conforms to expected aspects of the
result. As 𝑐 will not execute the task and compare results, there will
likely be false positives when evaluating malicious responses.
The overall trust value of an edge node is summarised by a
weighted mean over the expected values of these distributions:
T (𝑟, 𝑎) =
∑︁
𝑚∈𝑀 (𝑎)
𝜑𝑎,𝑚𝐸 [T𝑚 (𝑟, 𝑎)] (3)
where:
• 𝑀 (𝑎) is the set of metrics that relate to application 𝑎.
• 0 ≤ 𝜑𝑎,𝑚 ≤ 1 is the weight that application 𝑎 gives metric
𝑚. Applications use it to specify the relative importance of
metrics, with 1 =
∑
𝑚∈𝑀 (𝑎) 𝜑𝑎,𝑚 .
If a stereotypeS𝑚 (𝑟 ) is available for edge node 𝑟 and metric𝑚, then
the trust model for that metric is adjusted before calculating the
summarised trust. As these trust models are initialised as Beta(1, 1),
1 is subtracted from 𝛼 and 𝛽 .
T ′𝑚 (𝑟 ) =
{
T𝑚 (𝑟 ) .𝛼 − 1 + S𝑚 (𝑟 ).𝛼
T𝑚 (𝑟 ) .𝛽 − 1 + S𝑚 (𝑟 ).𝛽
(4)
The individual distributions are updated as per Algorithm 1,
where 𝑓
opinion
𝑎,𝑚 is an application 𝑎 and metric-specific𝑚 function
that evaluates the opinion IoT device 𝑐 has about a situation and
interaction. The situation details which task was submitted and the
interaction contains information about the last interaction with the
edge node. For example, a situation may be “Request route from a
to b” and the interaction may be “𝑟 timed out returning a response”.
To choose which edge node to submit a task to, that edge node
must support the application that originated the task and also have
a sufficiently high trust value. For this example model we imple-
mented a banded approach, where a sufficiently high trust value
is any trust value within some distance from the maximum trust
value. The chosen edge node is selected randomly from the edge
nodes that meet this criteria.
This trust model does not utilise the reputation information
disseminated. However, we have included it to demonstrate the cost
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Algorithm 1 Update state based on a situation and interaction
⊲ 𝑎 is an application, 𝑠 is a situation, 𝑖 is an interaction
1: function Update(𝑎, 𝑠 , 𝑖)
2: for𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 (𝑎) do
3: if RelevantInteraction(𝑎, 𝑠, 𝑖,𝑚) then
4: 𝑜 ← 𝑓 opinion𝑎,𝑚 (𝑠, 𝑖)
5: if 𝑜 = Successful then
6: T𝑚 (𝑒, 𝑎).𝛼 ← T𝑚 (𝑒, 𝑎).𝛼 + 1
7: else
8: T𝑚 (𝑒, 𝑎).𝛽 ← T𝑚 (𝑒, 𝑎).𝛽 + 1
𝜑𝑎,𝑚 sub res corr








Table 3: Application per-metric weights
that trust models that do utilise it incur, as this system architecture
is intended to be trust model agnostic.
6.2 Example Applications
To illustrate the operation of this system we implement two ex-
ample applications: (i) environment monitoring and (ii) vehicle
routing. The environment monitoring application generated a task
every 1min, which involves sending sensor data to an edge node.
The routing application generated a task every 2 to 3min contain-
ing source and destination coordinates and expected to receive a
route response within 2min. The routing application performs a
correctness check of a task result by checking that the source and
destination are the first and last items in the provided path. The
trust model weights for these two applications are shown in Table 3.
7 RESULTS
We now present results analysing three key aspects of this system:
(i) the RAM and Flash costs, which define the device specifications
of IoT devices, (ii) the cost of cryptographic operations, highlighting
the trade-offs made, and (iii) the runtime performance of the system
with example applications.
7.1 RAM and Flash Usage
The RAM and flash usage of the implementation (shown in Table 4)
was generated using nm on the compiled binary for IoT devices.
This only shows the cost of defined symbols such as static variables
and functions, it does not include strings. Symbols have been clas-
sified into categories to identify where the RAM and flash costs
are incurred. The implementation is limited by the RAM of the
IoT hardware. This is because dynamic memory allocation is typi-
cally avoided with embedded systems, as long-term use can lead to
memory fragmentation which prevents future allocation requests
succeeding. So instead fixed-size buffers are chosen at compile time.
In our implementation 64% of the RAM utilisation comes from
the buffers required to implement network access (contiki-ng/net),
certificate storage and digital signatures (system/crypto), and the
trust model (system/trust).
Flash RAM
Category (B) (%) (B) (%)
applications/monitoring 1 388 1.2 353 1.2
applications/routing 3 868 3.3 474 1.6
contiki-ng 7 280 6.2 846 2.9
contiki-ng/cc2538 14 556 12.4 2 356 8.0
contiki-ng/coap 8 556 7.3 2 388 8.1
contiki-ng/net 26 824 22.9 8 232 27.8
contiki-ng/oscore 5 512 4.7 1 010 3.4
newlib 26 415 22.6 2 534 8.6
system/common 3 188 2.7 37 0.1
system/crypto 6 210 5.3 5 173 17.5
system/mqtt-over-coap 1 490 1.3 503 1.7
system/trust 11 846 10.1 5 659 19.1
Total Used 117 133 100 29 565 100
Total Available 524 288 32 768
Table 4: IoT device RAM and flash usage
Operation Mean Cost Units
SHA256 637 ± 11.6 ns/B
ECC Sign (sepc256r1) 360 ± 0.04 ms
ECC Verify (sepc256r1) 711 ± 0.03 ms
ECDH 344 ± 0.02 ms
AES-CCM-16-64-128 Encrypt 0.94 ± 0.01 µs/B
AES-CCM-16-64-128 Decrypt 1.01 ± 0.01 µs/B
Table 5: Performance of Cryptographic Operations
7.2 Cryptographic Operations Cost
In this section, we perform profiling of the relevant cryptographic
operation costs on the Zolertia RE-Mote to understand the trade-offs
of using different message protection approaches. The hardware on
which these tests were performed has a clock with 32768 ticks per
second, which means timers have a resolution of 30.5 µs (3 s.f.). The
average costs are shown in Table 5 with 95% confidence intervals.
Results for SHA256 and ECC operations were gathered by gener-
ating a random plaintext with a random length from 1 to 1 024 B and
then signing and verifying that plaintext. As SHA256 is performed
as part of the sign operation, each sign and verify operates on a
constant number of bytes, so the results are not shown per byte.
Results for AES-CCM encryption and decryption were gathered
by generating a random plaintext with a random length from 1 to
1 024 B, a random 35 B of additional authenticated data (maximum
supported by OSCORE), a random 16 B key, and a random 13 B
nonce. The plaintext was encrypted and a 8 B authentication tag
was generated which was then decrypted and authenticated.
These results highlight the cost difference between AES-CCM
operations and the ECC operations on this IoT hardware. Perform-
ing an AES-CCM operation on a 100 B message is three orders of
magnitude faster than an ECC operation. This performance differ-
ence is why ECC operations are only used to derive a shared secret
for OSCORE and to disseminate signed reputation information,
whereas AES-CCM is used to protect all other messages.
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7.3 Task Submission
We performed a deployment with three IoT devices (wsn3, wsn4,
wsn5) and two edge nodes (rr2 and rr6) where both edge nodes
perform the monitoring application correctly, but rr6 always per-
forms incorrectly for the routing application. Incorrect behaviour
is randomly chosen from: (i) not sending a response, (ii) sending an
invalid response claiming it is correct, or (iii) sending a response
indicating a failure. The system was run for long enough for trust
values to begin to converge. Results are shown in Figure 8 where (i)
the IoT devices evaluate their trust that the edge node will execute
the task (lines) and (ii) the number of tasks a IoT device submits to
an edge node over a time period (bars).
Figure 8a shows results for the monitoring application, where
trust values start high (due to stereotypes) and remain high. There
are instances where trust values decrease, which may be due to
transient failures such as edge nodes failing to acknowledge a task
submission. The tasks submitted by the three IoT devices are dis-
tributed across the two edge nodes as no edge node has a sufficiently
low trust value for them to be excluded from task submission.
Figure 8b shows results for the routing application. The trust
values begin at a high value due to stereotype information, however,
the trust in the two edge nodes quickly diverge due to the differ-
ing behaviour. While rr6 has a trust value that is still within the
maximum distance from the highest trust value, it can be chosen to
execute tasks (as described in Section 6.1). However, after the trust
value becomes sufficiently low, rr6 is excluded from being selected
and the IoT devices only send tasks to the well behaving rr2.
7.4 Message cost
Results showing the number of bytes transmitted and received are
shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10 respectively, where messages have
been grouped into 5min windows. The results for IoT devices wsn4
and wsn5 are omitted as they show a similar pattern to wsn3.
The messages have been categorised where possible. Due to is-
sues with analysis tools not all OSCORE contexts can be decrypted,
so valid messages will appear as “oscore”. Not all 6LoWPAN frag-
ments could be reassembled, so are shown as “6lowpan-fragment”.
Packets marked as “oscore” were for a variety of purposes includ-
ing the two applications and potentially other categories where
messages could not be decrypted. “trust-dissem” packets are inten-
tionally not protected with OSCORE, as they need to be signed and
not encrypted. The implementation currently manually includes
a digital signature, which will be the case until Group OSCORE is
supported (as will be described in Section 8.3).
Comparing the two edge nodes rr2 (always good) and rr6 (always
bad) shows why an edge node may choose to perform maliciously,
as there is a greatly decreased cost in delivering the functionality.
Edge node 2 has a higher number of messages sent and received
than rr6 because by performing correctly it needs to deliver the
result of the application. For the routing application task, this means
that a result of 7 600 B needs to be delivered back to the IoT device
which involves sending 39 CoAP messages and receiving the same
number of acknowledgements in the best-case.
There is a decrease in the number of messages sent and received
on rr6 and the wsn3 at 8:30 because all three IoT devices choose to
use rr6 for all tasks in this period (as shown in Figure 8b). The same
































































































Figure 8: Trust values over time and nodes selected to exe-
cute tasks for two different applications
pattern appears at 8:40, but only for wsn3 as the other two edge
nodes send routing tasks to rr2. As rr6 behaves well for the moni-
toring application, IoT devices do not stop submitting monitoring
tasks to it. This is why rr6 continues to receive “oscore” messages
even after IoT devices stop sending routing tasks to it at 8:45.
The routing application has the largest proportion of bytes sent
(>52%) and received (>72%) for the three IoT devices. Trust dissem-
ination and subscribing to capabilities are also expensive, costing
10–13% of bytes sent and 7–10% of bytes received. Packets that our
analysis tools could not process (marked as “oscore”) took up 15–
17% of bytes transmitted and 4–5% of bytes received. This indicates
a worst case 50% overhead in transmitted bytes and 28% overhead
in received bytes to facilitate trust-based task offloading. In reality
these overheads will be lower, as some application packets were
categorised as “oscore”. The overhead will differ depending on the
frequency of reputation and capability dissemination, frequency
of tasks, and the payload sizes of tasks and their responses. De-
ployments would need to adjust the rate at which reputation and
capability information is disseminated based on application needs.
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Figure 9: Length of messages sent over 5 min windows




































































































































Figure 10: Length of messages received over 5 min windows
8 DISCUSSION
A number of design decisions were made due to limitations in the
software libraries available or to simplify implementation aspects.
We now discuss two considerations with using this architecture.
8.1 Use of MQTT Retain Flag
An optimisation to reduce the cost of announce and capability
messages would be to use the MQTT retain flag. This means when a
message is published, that message is saved and delivered to nodes
that subscribe in the future. However, a retained message may
contain outdated information (e.g., an edge crashed or a capability
becomes unavailable). Therefore, in this work we have chosen to
be conservative and have edges periodically publish information.
8.2 Forward Secrecy via ECHDE
We have proposed pre-deploying a public/private key pair to each
IoT device lasting the device’s lifetime. This simplifies key manage-
ment, reducing the cost of managing and exchanging keys. A down-
side is that using ECDH to derive a shared secret once (i.e., used
for the lifetime of the devices) does not provide forward-secrecy. If
required, then future standards (such as EDHOC [29]) that facilitate
ECDHE will be necessary to setup the OSCORE context.
8.3 Implementation Limitations
Due to the use of recently published standards there are some
features of the libraries being depended upon that are not yet im-
plemented. Firstly, the implementation of OSCORE for Contiki-NG
does not yet implement RFC 8613 Appendix B.1 [28], which means
that when nodes reset they will be unable to restart communication
via OSCORE. Secondly, the Group OSCORE draft standard [33] does
not yet have a working implementation so signed and unencrypted
trust packets cannot be protected by Group OSCORE. To work
around this, the payload is signed, however, this will not protect
the CoAP headers that Group OSCORE protects.
9 CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a system for facilitating trust-based task of-
floading for multiple applications on IoT devices. Through two case
studies and an example trust model, we show how a suitable edge
node is selected as the destination for offloading. In our example,
it took 6 rounds of task submissions over under 30min for a per-
manently bad node to be excluded and at worst a 50% overhead in
transmitted bytes and 28% overhead in received bytes. The imple-
mentation applies recent IoT security standards such as OSCORE
and will make use of future standards such as Group OSCORE to
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provide security guarantees. We have also developed the building
blocks to enable the use of more complex trust models that involve
the use of disseminated reputation information and stereotypes. For
future work, we plan to perform a threat modelling of this system
to guide the development of resilient trust models.
DATA STATEMENT
The software used to generate these results can be found at https:
//github.com/MBradbury/iot-trust-task-alloc. The data gathered
and presented in this paper can be found at [8].
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